Quantum Communication Protocol Employing Weak Measurements by Botero, Alonso & Reznik, Benni
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
99
08
00
6v
2 
 2
7 
Se
p 
19
99
Quantum Communication Protocol Employing Weak Measurements
Alonso Botero1,∗ and Benni Reznik2
1 Center for Particle Physics, University of Texas, Austin, Texas 78712
2 School of Physics and Astronomy, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel
We propose a communication protocol exploiting corre-
lations between two events with a definite time-ordering: a)
the outcome of a weak measurement on a spin, and b) the
outcome of a subsequent ordinary measurement on the spin.
In our protocol, Alice, first generates a “code” by performing
weak measurements on a sample of N spins. The sample is
sent to Bob, who later performs a post-selection by measur-
ing the spin along either of two certain directions. The results
of the post-selection define the “key”, which he then broad-
casts publicly. Using both her previously generated code and
this key, Alice is able to infer the direction chosen by Bob in
the post-selection. Alternatively, if Alice broadcasts publicly
her code, Bob is able to infer from the code and the key the
direction chosen by Alice for her weak measurement. Two
possible experimental realizations of the protocols are briefly
mentioned.
Weak measurements [1–3] are a special class of quan-
tum measurements explored in recent years by Aharonov,
Vaidman, and others. In one such measurement of any
given observable A, the disturbance caused to the system
is minimized at the expense of precision in a single trial.
Nevertheless, after a large number trials one can deter-
mine statistical averages such as the expectation value of
A. The distinctive feature of weak measurements has to
do with the observed averages when the measured sys-
tem is post-selected. Such averages, the so-called weak
values, may lie outside the bounds of the spectrum of
A [2]. Moreover, since they depend on the chosen pre-
and post-selected ensemble, weak values carry non-trivial
information about the choice of measurement used for
post-selection. In accordance with causality, these un-
usual regularities must therefore be a priori undetectable,
i.e., “hidden in the noise” [3]. Hence, they can only
be extracted a posteriori, from the correlations between
readings of the measurement and the result of the post-
selection.
In the two protocols suggested in this Letter, such cor-
relations are used for signaling. In the first protocol, the
receiver, Alice, starts by generating a code correspond-
ing to the outcomes of a series of weak measurements on
a large sample of spins. She then hands them to Bob,
who is about to depart on a long voyage, together with
an important question that he can only answer at some
later time. When he is ready to respond, Bob performs
an ordinary measurement (post-selection) on these spins.
His response corresponds to the choice of spin component
he then measures; for instance, a measurement of σy to
signal a “yes” (“I will marry you”), or a measurement
of σz to signal a “no”. The random sequence of results
obtained in either of these measurements plays the role
of a key, which he then broadcasts publicly. This is just
enough information for Alice to bin her previous read-
ings and extract the message from the weak values. The
random key is useless to the ever-jealous Eve; it can be
shown that an optimal sample size exists which is still
too small for Eve to infer Bob’s choice from the statistics
of the key.
The security of this protocol is however compromised
if the spins fall in the hands of the eavesdropper. This
drawback is overcome in the second protocol, in which
instead it is Alice who sends the message; for this, she
performs on the N spins either of two possible weak mea-
surements and generates a code corresponding to her out-
comes. She then sends the spins and the code to Bob.
To decode the message Bob post-selects the spins by per-
forming a sequence of strong measurements. As in the
first case, the resulting key allows him to bin the code
and deduce from the weak values Alice’s choice of mea-
surement. In this case, Eve cannot intercept the message
from the spins without Bob being aware of her actions.
We begin by analyzing the weak measurement scheme.
Suppose that Alice prepares a sample of N spin-1/2 par-
ticles, in the eigenstate |x+〉 of σx, and she wishes to
perform a weak measurement of the spin observable
A ≡ 1√
2
(σx + σy) , (1)
with eigenstates |a±〉. We let p be the pointer variable
of the measuring device and |φi〉 its initial state, with a
Gaussian wave function φi(p) = (2pi∆p
2)−1/4e−p
2/4∆p2
of uncertainty ∆p. The weak measurement may then be
described by the usual transformation taking an initial
product state |Ψi〉 ≡ |x+〉|φi〉 of the spin and the device,
to a final entangled state:
|Ψi〉 → |Ψf〉 = c+|a+〉|φ+〉+ c−|a−〉|φ−〉 , (2)
where c± = 〈a ± |x+〉, and |φ±〉 is |φi〉 shifted in p by
±1. In contrast however to an ordinary measurement,
∆p is here assumed to be so large that the shifted states
|φ±〉 overlap considerably. Nevertheless, the expectation
value of p is still shifted by the usual expectation value
〈A〉:
〈Ψf |p|Ψf 〉 = 〈x+ |A|x+〉 = 1√
2
. (3)
The idea of a weak measurement is thus to extract such
systematic shifts of the means from a large sample of
identically prepared spins, ensuring at the same time a
1
minimal disturbance of any individual spin. This distur-
bance is naturally related to the overlap between |φ+〉
and |φ−〉.
A convenient measure of disturbance D is given in
terms of the Fidelity F [4] as D ≡ 1 − F , where F is
defined as the probability of obtaining back the initial
state after the weak measurement, F = ||〈x+ |Ψf 〉||2;
hence, D may be interpreted as the probability of “flip-
ping” the initial direction of the spin. As one verifies, D
involves the overlap factor 〈φ+ |φ−〉 = e−1/2∆p2 :
D =
∆A2
2
(1− e−1/2∆p2) ≃ 1
8∆p2
. (4)
We assume in the approximation that D is small and take
∆A2 = 〈A2〉 − 〈A〉2 = 1/2.
Together then with the weakness condition D ≪ 1,
the resulting distribution for the pointer variable must
be sufficiently broad that the spectrum of A cannot be
resolved. The distribution therefore takes essentially a
Gaussian form, centered at the expectation value 〈A〉,
with a large uncertainty
√
∆p2 +∆A2 ≃ ∆p of order
D−1/2. Since in N identical and independent trials the
expected sample mean is p¯ = 〈A〉 ± ∆p/√N , Alice can
determine 〈A〉 if her sample is large enough.
But now suppose that after completing her measure-
ments Alice gives the spins to Bob, who later performs a
second, now ordinary measurement on each spin, along
some arbitrary direction bˆ with possible outcomes |b±〉.
Each outcome in this post-selection is correlated with a
particular response of the measuring device. To keep
track of these correlations it is convenient to re-express
the combined state of the system and apparatus in terms
of the basis |b±〉
|Ψf 〉 = |b+〉|φ(b+)〉+ |b−〉|φ(b−)〉 , (5)
where the conditional response of the apparatus is de-
scribed by the unnormalized states |φ(b±)〉 = 〈b ± |Ψf 〉.
For a given result |b〉,
|φ(b)〉 = C
[
1 +Aw(b)
2
|φ+〉+ 1−Aw(b)
2
|φ−〉
]
, (6)
here C = 〈b|x+〉 and Aw is the weak value of A, defined
as
Aw(b) ≡ 〈b|A|x+〉〈b|x+〉 . (7)
The weak value Aw(b) is the defining property of weak
measurements: as before, when D is small the pointer
distribution is essentially Gaussian of uncertainty ≃ ∆p;
however, as one can easily show, the location of the mean
〈p〉 = 〈φ(b)| p |φ(b)〉〈φ(b)|φ(b)〉 is now given by
〈p〉 = ReAw(b)
1 + δP (b)P (b)
= ReAw +O(D) (8)
where, in terms of D,
δP (b)
P (b)
= −1− |Aw(b)|
2
∆A2
D . (9)
The correction δP (b)P (b) is the relative deviation of the prob-
ability P ′(b) = 〈φ(b)|φ(b)〉 of obtaining |b〉 in the presence
of the weak measurement, as measured from the unper-
turbed probability P (b) = |〈b|ψ〉|2. We see therefore that
the average conditional reading becomes the real part of
the weak value Aw(b) as we approach the ideally weak
situation in which the transition probability is left unal-
tered by the measurement.
To summarize then: if Alice starts with a large sam-
ple of N identical spins, she obtains a broad distribution
of pointer readings with a sample mean 〈A〉 ± ∆p/√N ;
however, were she to know– for every single spin–which of
the two possible outcomes |b+〉 and |b−〉 was obtained in
Bob’s measurement, then she could divide her readings
into two categories, corresponding to two post-selected
sub-samples of size N± ≃ NP (b±). Her original distribu-
tion would then break up as a mixture of two conditional
distributions, with sample means Aw(b+) and Aw(b−)
within errors of ∆p/
√
N±. The break-up is captured by
a simple sum rule [5] in the limit D → 0
〈A〉 = P (b)ReAw(b) + P (b−)ReAw(b−) , (10)
which serves as the basis for our protocol.
For simplicity let us first consider a complete cycle
at the end of which Alice receives from Bob a single-
bit “yes” or “no” message. When Alice prepares her
spin sample in the eigenstate |x+〉, she labels each spin
as i = 1 , ..N . From her N weak measurements of
1√
2
(σx + σy), she then generates the code by recording a
string of real numbers corresponding to the pointer read-
ings {p1, p2, ..pN}; the sample mean p¯ = 1N
∑
i pi should
yield the expectation value 〈A〉 ≃ 1/√2. Next the spins
are given to Bob, carefully keeping track of the ordering.
Now it’s his turn to send the message. If Bob decides to
send a “yes”, he measures σy on every single spin; other-
wise he measures σz to signal a “no”. In either case, from
the resulting sequence of outcomes he generates the key:
an ordered list of N bits {k1, k2, ... kn} where, say, ki = 1
and 0 respectively correspond to the outcomes “up” and
“down” for the the i-th spin. It is this key which Bob
sends back to Alice using an insecure channel. As the key
is effectively random by virtue of the fact that yˆ and zˆ lie
on the equal-probability plane, the uncorrelated sequence
of “1” and “0”’s will be useless to the eavesdropper.
On the other hand, Alice, upon receiving the key, may
go back to her code and separate each reading pi into
either of two bins, depending on whether ki = 1 or 0.
Finally, she computes the mean values of p in each bins
p¯1 =
∑
i piki∑
i ki
, p¯0 =
∑
i pi(1− ki)∑
i(1− ki)
. (11)
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She takes these values as estimates of the “true” means
within errors of order ∆p/
√
N/2. Now, if indeed Bob
sent a “yes”, then she should see that p¯0 ≃ Aw(y−) = 0,
and an “eccentric” weak value p¯1 ≃ Aw(y+) =
√
2. In-
stead, if Bob sent a “no”, then she will find no significant
deviation in either of the two means p¯1 or p¯0; for this case,
the real part of Aw(z±) coincides with the sample mean
of 〈A〉 = 1/√2. Thus, by distinguishing between a non-
trivial and a trivial break-up of the sample mean, Alice
can decode Bob’s single-bit message [6].
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FIG. 1. Schematic of a cycle from which Alice receives a
“yes” response from Bob.
One may object that due to the small disturbance of
the weak measurements, the average numbers of “1”’s
and “0”’s in the key are no longer identical for the two fi-
nal measurements of σy and σz. Indeed, by eq. (9), there
is no change in the probabilities for the measurement
along z, but for the measurement along y the relative
change in the probabilities is δP (y±)/P (y±) = ±2D.
The difference may then be used by Eve to distinguish
between the two messages if the string is sufficiently long.
This leads us to compare the minimal sample sizes NE
and NA, respectively, required by Eve and Alice to ex-
tract the message from their available data. Alice needs
to distinguish between the statistics with means
√
2 and
0. Hence she requires that
√
2 >∼ ∆p/
√
NA/2, which
by eq. (4) yields NA >∼ 1/D. On the other hand, Eve
must distinguish between the relative frequencies of “1”’s
of 1/2 for ”no” and 1/2 ± D for ”yes”, with an uncer-
tainty in the frequencies ∆f ≃ 1/2√N ; for this she needs
NE >∼ 1/D2 trials. The ratio between the two optimal
sample sizes therefore scales like NENA ∼ 1D and conse-
quently, for a sufficiently small D, an optimal value N
may be chosen such that NE ≫ N ≥ NA ensuring that
the key is safe.
While this protocol is particularly interesting from the
conceptual point of view as we further discuss below, it
would fail to meet usual cryptography security require-
ments had Alice sent the spins to Bob using a public
channel. In such case, Eve could have intercepted the
message by performing weak measurements and using
the public key sent by Bob [7]. The security drawback is
avoided in the second protocol, where by a similar set of
measurements, Alice sends a message to Bob.
As before, Alice starts with N spins in the |x+〉 state.
To send a “yes” she next performs, on each spin sepa-
rately, a weak measurement of (σx + σy)/
√
2. To send
a “no” she measures weakly (σx − σy)/
√
2. In either
case she records the results as a code of N real numbers,
and sends to Bob publicly both the code and the spins.
To decode the message Bob decides in a random man-
ner to perform on each spin an ordinary measurement,
of either σx or σy. The σx measurement is needed as
a “security check”, while the results of the σy measure-
ment will be used to decode the message. If the spins
were not disturbed after Alice’s measurement, in ∼ N/2
cases that Bob measures σx he gets σx = 1 and only
∼ ND ≪ N/4 times σx = −1. On the other hand, he
finds σy = ±1 with nearly equal probability. The lat-
ter are used to bin the code, into two subsamples each
with ∼ N/4 spins, corresponding to the post-selection of
σy = 1 and σy = −1. Finally he computes the mean value
of each subsample. If Alice had measured (σx + σy)/
√
2,
Bob will find the weak values
√
2 and 0, respectively. If
instead she had measured (σx − σy)/
√
2, he will find the
same means but in reverse order.
To discuss the question of security, notice that the
weak measurements rotate the spin to two slightly dif-
ferent spin states. For a typical reading p = 1/
√
2±∆p,
the overlap between the two rotated states is of the or-
der of 1 − D, as they lie at angle of ∼ √D from x+.
Now, since Bob requires N ∼ 1/D to decode the mes-
sage, the overlap between the two “yes/no” collective N -
spin states becomes nearly orthogonal. The crucial point
is that now there are two distinct ways to distinguish
between these states. The first, Bob’s method of post-
selecting the spins separately, is not available to Eve; for
instance, if she post-selects in the σy direction, Bob will
notice that the mean of σx changed. An alternative is
then for Eve to perform a collective projection. How-
ever, in order to determine which projector she needs to
measure in the 2N -dimensional Hilbert space, Eve must
be in possession of the code before she gets the spins.
This information can therefore be concealed from Eve
if Alice sends the code after the spins have passed by
Eve, or if she sends the spins only one at a time. It can
further be shown that by separate spin measurements,
which rotate the spin by less than
√
D, Eve cannot gain
information. The security of the protocol, hence rests
on two ingredients: the non-commutativity of Bob’s final
measurements, as in key distribution protocol [8], and a
temporal separation between the spins and the code or
between spins themselves. Such a temporal delay was
suggested by Goldenberg and Vaidman [9]. However the
latter proposal requires the use of a quantum storage
which is not needed in our case; Bob can complete his
3
measurements before receiving the code.
A simple quantum optical realization of the protocols
should be feasible following a previous proposal [10,11]
for observing weak values through the interaction of a co-
herent state in a high-Q resonant cavity with a pre- and
post-selected Rydberg atom. Here the photon occupation
number plays the role of the pointer variable. Another re-
alization may employ EPR-type correlations in a photon-
pair generated via parametric down conversion process.
In this case, one will perform a weak-measurement on one
photon and an ordinary measurement on the other. Weak
measurements of polarization have been suggested [12,13]
and carried out for classical light [14,15]. In the present
case, one step further is required, since the measurement
must be performed on each photon separately.
To conclude with, it is conceptually instructive to com-
pare the present suggestion to the Bennett-Wiesner com-
munication scheme [16]: Alice prepares an EPR pair and
sends one of the particles to Bob. When Bob wishes to
send a 2-bit message to Alice, he performs a pi rotation
of his spin around the x, y or z axis, or does nothing.
He then sends the spin back to Alice, who can reveal his
actions by measuring a joint observable. This scheme,
as well as other well known schemes such as teleporta-
tion [17] or quantum key distribution [8,18], ordinarily
rely on entanglement and its preservation [19]. While
in the present proposal the weak measurement can be
formulated in terms of entanglement between the mea-
suring device and the system, as in eq. (5), the order
of events is here such that the entanglement is no longer
“there” once the reading of the weak measurement has
been recorded.
How should we then understand the flow of information
in the present case? Bennett and Wiesner suggested after
Schumacher, that since in their scheme only one qbit is
returned to Alice while two bits of information are trans-
mitted, “ one bit of information is sent forward in time...
while the other bit is sent backwards in time to the EPR
source, then forward in time through the untreated parti-
cle”. In our first example, because the code is prepared
before Bob sends his message, and because no useful in-
formation can be extracted from the key, the message is
in some sense already “in” the code. It seems therefore
that the full one bit of information is sent backwards in
time. Yet, it is only with the aid of the post-selected
“key” that the message is extracted from the quantum
noise. Therefore, no conflict arises between macroscopic
causality and this apparently retrocausal flow of infor-
mation.
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